Centre and periphery: the arguments
Does globalization produce convergence, or does it widen the gaps between rich and poor nations? It turns out that theory is ambiguous about this important question, so we need economic history to get the answers. The late nineteenth century is one good place to look. There was economic convergence in the Atlantic economy during this period, but the growth experience around the backward European periphery was hardly uniform. Some regions, like Ireland, converged on the economic leaders at about the expected rate; others, like Scandinavia, converged at a ferocious rate; and still others, like Iberia, failed to converge at all.
There^are, then, two questions that motivate this paper: First, why did some nations around the periphery do so much better than others? Second, is the explanation for success or failure always the same? Economists involved in the convergence debate rarely ask such questions since they are trained to stop with hypothesis testing. Economic historians demand more since we want to know which forces mattered most, when, where and why. These take two forms: shared globalization forces, which have a potential impact on everyone, and idiosyncratic forces, which are country-specific.
Education is a country-specific variable which has assumed great prominence in the historical debate on the European periphery and in the empirical growth literature. Lars Sandberg has argued that good education helps explain Swedish catch-up and Gabriel Tortella has argued that poor education helps explain Latin fall-back. When European nations are assessed collectively, does schooling persist as an important ingredient of late nineteenth century catch-up and fall-back, or was it instead a peculiarity of a few outlying countries?
The globalization forces at work between 1870 and 1913 are well-known to economic historians: international labour, capital and commodity markets all became increasingly integrated up to the First World War. European labour migrated to the labour-scarce New World and from low-wage to high-wage European labour markets; Britain placed enormous amounts of capital overseas while France and Germany invested large amounts around the capital-scarce European periphery; transport costs plunged worldwide, subjecting Europe to an invasion of new world grain and heightened competition from each other. To what extent does participation in this growing international economy explain late nineteenth century Scandinavian success? To what extent do Iberian efforts to insulate themselves from these forces explain their failure? And what about Ireland and Italy, lying in the middle of this range? How much of the catch-up and fall-back performance around the periphery can be explained simply by each country's ability and willingness to emigrate? Section 2 assesses the economic performance of the European periphery in the late nineteenth century, documenting where convergence and divergence took place. The important point is not so much whether there was overall convergence, but rather why some countries did so much better than others. Thus, Section 3 provides a test of the Sandberg and Tortella hypothesis, estimating the impact of schooling on performance around the periphery. Sections 4 and 5 then turn to the roles of emigration and international capital flows in accounting for the variety around the European periphery, while Section 6 looks at the impact of declining transport costs and commercial policy responses. A research agenda is offered in Section 7.
Documenting performance around the periphery
This section exploits three sources of evidence, and four variables, in an effort to gauge late nineteenth century performance around the periphery. While each of these sources has flaws, they appear to support the same conclusions.
The first contains purchasing-power-parity adjusted real wages for the urban unskilled in sixteen countries, based mainly on the earlier work of one of the present authors (Williamson 1995) , but revised extensively since.
Williamson's sixteen countries include: four New World countries -Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States; five European industrial leaders forming the core -Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands; and seven from the European periphery -Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The data used here repair some modest errors in the British series, and replace the older Spanish series with a more recent one from Simpson (1995) . Scholars are busy at work revising the Argentine, Canadian and Dutch series, but they were not available at time of writing. Finally, some have challenged the Scandinavian real wage series as overstating the catch-up. This has been true especially of the Norwegian data, which are based on unskilled wages in public works construction. The reader is referred to Williamson's original 1995 article for a defence, but note that we insist on using urban, male, unskilled wage rates throughout, typically in the building trades. Only by doing so can we be assured of job and skill comparability across countries. The second source documents trends in the wage-rental ratio, a relative factor price index that measures the scarcity of land compared with labour. The ratio is based on the revised unskilled urban wages already discussed and farm land values for ten of our countries (O'Rourke et al. 1996) : includes Argentina, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the United States).
The third source is Angus Maddison, whose data have been used almost exclusively by economic historians engaged in the convergence debate. Maddison's GDP per worker-hour and GDP per capita estimates are for a sample which overlaps with Williamson's sixteen, except that Maddison excludes Argentina and Ireland, but includes Austria, Finland and Switzerland (Maddison 1994) . However, we replace Maddison's estimates for Portugal, Spain and Italy with those made more recently by Prados de la Escosura et al. (1993) and Bardini et al. (1995) .* Before we proceed with our narrative, let us first define the members of our European sample. Table 1 reports 1870 real wages and GDP per head for fifteen European countries. The two indices reveal similar rankings. The industrial core countries had levels of GDP per head 30 per cent higher than the European average and 67 per cent higher than the periphery. Their real wages were 86 per cent higher than the periphery. Alternatively, real wages in the periphery were 46 per cent below the industrial core average and GDP per head 40 per cent below. Austria and Denmark seem to have been on the margin between core and periphery: without them, the periphery GDP per head would have been 46 per cent below the industrial core average. Perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, we have thrown both Austria and Denmark into the periphery group. Thus, the nine members of the European periphery are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The reader will note that the sample excludes east and southeast Europe simply because the late nineteenth century data are inadequate for those regions. We know, however, that they were relatively poor. The evidence of Bairoch (1976a, Table 6, p. 286) suggests that none of them had levels of GNP per head that were even half that of the core: e.g., Bulgaria, 42.3 per cent of the core; Greece, 48.1 per cent; Romania, 40.4 per cent; Russia, 48.1 per cent; and Serbia, 44.2 per cent. Thus, with the exception of Portugal, this paper ignores the poorest part of Europe. Hopefully, as better historical data emerge from east and southeast Europe they will confirm the assertions which follow.
Let us start the narrative with the success up North, the spectacular Scandinavian catch-up on the leaders. Consistent with qualitative accounts, the evidence in Table 2 confirms that Sweden and Denmark tended to outperform Norway and Finland, but not by much. While real wages show Sweden growing considerably faster than Norway, GDP per capita growth and GDP per worker-hour growth reveal only modest differences between the Scandinavians. Rapid growth seems to have been common to all four Nordic countries.
Real wages in Scandinavia grew at rates almost three times those prevailing in the European core; Swedish workers enjoyed real wage growth about 2.7 times that of British workers; Danish workers enjoyed real wage growth about 2.6 times that of German workers; and Norwegian workers enjoyed real wage growth about 3.8 times that of Dutch workers. In fact, no Williamson (1995 , Table A1 .1, Great Britain revised), except for Spain which now uses Simpson (1995, Tables A.18 and A. 19, pp. 250-2) . In addition, the benchmark for The Netherlands, Portugal, Norway and Spain has been shifted from 1905 to 1927, as the 1927 data to make the necessary PPP adjustments are superior to the 1905 data, for these four countries. This change affects the 1870 levels in Table 1 but not the growth rates here. All real wage growth rates are calculated from estimated log linear regressions 1870-1913 (raw wage data are annual). Table 2 -1), except for Italy, Portugal and Spain which use GDP from Bardini et al. (1995, Appendix Table 1 ) and population from Mitchell (1978 , Table Ai) . Col. (4): Gross domestic product in constant prices, per worker-hour, from Maddison (1991 , Table C.io and 1994, Table 2 -1), except for Italy, Portugal and Spain which is based on Bardini et al. (1995, Appendix other country in our European sample underwent real wage growth even close to that of Sweden, Denmark or Norway. What was true for real wages was also true for the wage-rental ratio. While the ratio of wage rates per worker to farm land values per acre fell everywhere in the New World, it rose everywhere in Europe (with the exception of Spain). These events reflect the invasion of grains from the New World (and Russia) which lowered farm rents and land values in Europe and raised them in the American Midwest, the Australian outback, the Argentine pampas and, we assume but do not document, the Ukraine. While the Scandinavian wage-rental ratio seems to have tracked the British ratio very closely (2.65 vs 2.54 per cent per annum growth), the ratio rose half again faster in Scandinavia than in the European core (2.65 vs 1.74 per cent per annum). Consistent with the predictions of theory (O'Rourke and Williamson 1995b) , product per worker-hour documents a less spectacular Scandinavian catch-up than factor prices, but even these data confirm an impressive growth performance compared with the European industrial core (1.77 vs 1.46 per cent per annum). Finally, the superiority of Scandinavian GDP per capita growth over that of the industrial core (1.45 vs 1.2 per cent per annum) is smaller than that of real wages or GDP per worker-hour, but the Scandinavians still did better.
Scandinavia outperformed the rest of Europe (and probably the rest of the world) in the late nineteenth century, of that there can be no doubt. What about the rest of the periphery?
Based on Maddison's data, Austria seems to have done about as well as Scandinavia: GDP per capita and GDP per worker-hour grew almost exactly as fast (1.46 vs 1.45 and 1.76 vs 1.77). In contrast, while Ireland certainly obeyed the laws of convergence, she was no over-achiever. Irish real wages grew twice as fast as they did in the industrial core (1.79 vs 0.90 per annum), but they grew no faster than the periphery average, and at less than 70 per cent of the Scandinavian rate. On the other hand, the wagerental ratio rose faster in Ireland than in Scandinavia.
As a unit, the western Mediterranean Basin did badly. Gabriel Tortella (1994a) has recently surveyed performance in the Basin, so we can be brief. The Iberian peninsula fell far behind the growth rates recorded in the rest of the periphery. Real wages crawled upwards at about 0.4 per cent a year in Iberia, while they surged five and a half times as quickly elsewhere around the periphery: like some Third World countries since 1970, Spain and Portugal seem to have missed out on a wave of global growth. While the wage-rental ratio soared at 3.23 per cent a year elsewhere around the periphery, it fell by 0.43 per cent a year in Iberia. The same wide gap appears for GDP per capita growth, 0.9 per cent per annum in Iberia and 1.42 per cent per annum elsewhere around the periphery. Maddison's real GDP per worker-hour data also confirm a poor Iberian performance, but the gap is not quite so great: 1.31 per cent per annum in Iberia and 1.7 per cent per annum around the rest of the periphery. According to all three living standards measures, Iberia grew less rapidly than the core, confirming Iberian 'fall-back'. Italy does somewhat better, but even she -except for real wages -falls below the average for the periphery, and productivity grew less rapidly there than in the core.
Peripheral performance in the light of convergence
Thus, we have four types of performers around the periphery: the overachieving catchers up (the Nordic four and Austria), the average catcher up (Ireland), the slower catcher up (Italy), and the under-achieving fallers behind (the western Mediterranean Basin). This paper is motivated by this enormous variance, but note that on average there is evidence of convergence in Europe during the late nineteenth century. The periphery grew faster than the industrial core. Real wages grew almost twice as fast (1.73 vs 0.90 per cent per annum). The wage-rental ratio grew a third faster (2.32 vs 1.74 per cent per annum). GDP per capita and per worker-hour also grew faster, although less so than was true for factor prices (1.29 vs 1.20 and 1.60 vs 1.46 per cent per annum). Thus, the periphery was catching up on the leaders in Europe, especially in terms of workers' living standards. Furthermore, there was factor price convergence between the European periphery and the New World: real wages in the labour abundant periphery grew about half as fast again as those in the labour scarce New World; and while the wage-rental ratio around the periphery boomed at 2.32 per cent per annum, it fell in the New World at about three per cent per annum.
Did Scandinavia grow as fast as economists' convergence models predict? Or did it grow faster? Was Ireland really 'average'? And how far below the prediction of a convergence model was the Mediterranean Basin? Figure 1 Log real wage (1870) 4.5 Figure 1 . Unconditional real wage convergence .
supplies an answer using real wages, 2 and Table 3 reports the underlying unconditional convergence regressions for real wages as well as for GDP per 2 The /3 underlying Figure 1 is -0.177 (Table 3 , row 1, entry 1). The rate of convergence is A = (i/r)ln(j3 + 1) where t is the time span (43 years) and jS is the coefficient for the log of initial real wages, income per capita or labour productivity. Actually, we use the term 'speed of convergence' too loosely in this context. Speed of convergence technically is A times the initial gap. If A = 0.01, then it would take 70 years to cut the gaps in half. Eliminating big initial gaps takes a long time, even when fast convergence is at work and even if it is not interrupted. Previous history matters. (1) which is revised based on the real wage revisions reported in Table 2 .
worker-hour. 3 The equation estimated is widely used in the convergence literature (Barro I99i 3 Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992; Mankiw et al. 1992; Prados de la Escosura et al. 1993) . Thus, in the first row of Table 3 our measure of late nineteenth century real wage growth is simply regressed on the logarithm of the real wage in 1870. While the r-statistics are poor in both cases, the results confirm unconditional convergence -i.e. the coefficient is negative. Note also that Figure 1 suggests the source of the low r-statistics, the poor growth performance of Portugal and Spain. Tables 3 and 4 exclude Austria, Finland and Switzerland so as to make it as comparable with the real wage sample as possible. However, when these three countries are thrown back in to the sample, the unconditional and conditional convergence results are much poorer. To repeat: the real wage sample includes Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States; the 'overlapping' GDP per worker sample includes all of these except Argentina and Ireland. 4 (Bardini et al. 1995) , unconditional convergence pretty much disappears (row 2, Table 3 ). In a sense, the same seems to be true of real wages. Before the underlying data set was revised, unconditional real wage convergence was evident in the data (Williamson 1995 (Williamson , 1996 . The unconditional convergence now reported in Table 3 is much weaker.
The question of whether there was convergence in the aggregate data is not however the focus of this paper; rather, we are concerned with why some countries did so much better than others. Throughout, we frame the discussion by asking: what explains the catch-up or fall-back of individual peripheral countries relative to the economic giants of the day. Great Britain and the US? Was it schooling that mattered? Different rates of emigration and capital inflows from abroad? The choice between free trade and protection? Cultural-based mysteries?
3. Schooling, catch-up and fall-back Sandberg (1979, p. 228 ) stated clearly that 'Sweden's pre-World War I economic growth and industrialization was to a significant degree a result of the country's disproportionately large initial stock of [human capital]'. The human capital that Sandberg thought mattered most was schooling and literacy. A decade before Sandberg's paper, Cipolla (1969) had already offered plenty of evidence supporting the impoverished sophisticate thesis. Cipolla (1969, Table 6 ) documented high literacy levels in Scandinavia compared with the rest of Europe and based on such evidence, argued that the 'more literate countries were the first to import the Industrial Revolution (p. 87)'. By 1850, Sweden was the most literate country in Europe and was the only European country that could measure up to the United States in that dimension (Sandberg 1979, p. 230) .
5 Indeed, in a later paper Sandberg used Cipolla's 1850 qualitative data on literacy to show that the 1850 educational ranking was highly correlated with the 1970 per capita income ranking, and that up to 1913 'the poor, high literacy countries ... grew the fastest... [and] the low literacy countries ... growth rate was clearly slower' (Sandberg 1982, p. 689) . Tortella (1994a) has recently elaborated on this latter observation to find explanations for economic retardation in the Mediterranean Basin.
How can we evaluate such claims? O'Rourke and Williamson (1995b) followed Prados de la Escosura et al. (1993) in estimating conditional convergence equations for the late nineteenth century; that is, they estimated convergence equations such as those reported in Table 3 , conditional on schooling. In this paper we revise the analysis, to take account of the new real wage data documented above.
The new growth empiricists use school enrolment rates as a proxy for average educational achievement in analysing conditional convergence in the post Second World War period. It is hardly a perfect index of average schooling in the labour force (a stock) since it measures the enrolment rates Table 3 ).
of children (a flow). Table 4 also offers estimates of average literacy, theoretically a far better index of average schooling even though in this case it applies only to young adults. Sad to say, there is reason to doubt the quality of the literacy data. Indeed, this is exactly why the new growth empiricists prefer school enrolment rates -quality and availability. Note also that Table 4 offers two late nineteenth century enrolment rate estimates: column (3) is taken from Leandro Prados and his collaborators; column (1) reports our own estimates. While each of these three measures of schooling is imperfect, they appear to tell roughly the same story. Consider first our enrolment rate estimates in column (1) of Table 4 6 Irish literacy was far better than her enrolment rates; indeed, the former is ten per cent higher than the European average, while the latter is 18 per cent lower.
There are clearly huge potential problems with the literacy data, since emigrants may have self-selected in terms of education. In fact, by this measure Ireland was more literate than the US during the period, an absurd result. Thus, while we perform all tests using both measures, in the text we emphasise the results using enrolment data, which have the additional advantage of being more directly comparable with the results of those modern growth studies already referred to.
There was certainly variety in school enrolment and literacy rates around the European periphery. The Scandinavian countries had a bigger education endowment than they could, in some sense, afford.
7 The Iberian countries 6 The same is true of Great Britain, which suggests it may have something to do with how students were counted in the United Kingdom compared with the Continent; alternatively, literacy may have been higher among UK emigrants, relative to the population as a whole, than was true on the Continent. 7 Markussen (1990, p. 37) has stressed that the Nordic countries were unique in that there was a long lag, perhaps 100-150 years, between development of reading and writing skills. Indeed, while their reading skills and enrolment rates are well above what one would expect for poor countries (Table 4) , Markussen (1990, Table 5 where convergence equations are conditioned by schooling, the latter proxied first by enrolment rates (the standard proxy) and second by literacy rates. The conditional convergence equations were estimated on both real wage and GDP per worker-hour data. The contribution of schooling to GDP per worker-hour growth is statistically significant in both cases, supporting the view that schooling was important to late nineteenth century growth. Schooling also 'conditioned' real wage convergence in the late nineteenth century, although literacy does better in terms of significance than does enrolment. Poor countries well endowed with schooling caught up faster than those poorly endowed, presumably because their 'social capabilities' were better established (Abramovitz 1986) . That is, they were better able to exploit open economy and globalization effects or were better able to absorb new technologies transferred from the leaders. Furthermore, when conditioned by schooling, the rate of real wage convergence (X) rises from 0.5 to 0.7 or 1 per cent per annum, and the rate of GDP per workerhour convergence rises from 0.1 per cent per annum to 0.4 or 0.8 per cent per annum.
What we really want to know, however, is whether schooling played a central role in accounting for Scandinavian, Italian and Irish convergence, and for Iberian divergence. We can find out by asking a second question: How much of each country's 'deviant' growth performance between 1870 and 1913 was due to each country's 'deviant' schooling performance? As the notes to Panel B in Table 5 indicate, 'deviant' growth is defined as the residual left over after controlling for initial real wage levels, while 'deviant' schooling is simply how much it exceeded the average. Panel Bi answers the question.
In fifteen of thirty-two cases schooling didn't matter at all. These were almost always European industrial leaders or rich New World countries who, presumably, had already fulfilled some minimum schooling precondition. But schooling did matter for about a tenth to a third of deviant good growth among the Scandinavian three, the bigger numbers for literacy and the smaller for enrolment: good schooling accounted for 7-31 per cent of deviant good growth in Sweden; for 9-29 per cent in Denmark; and for 8-39 per cent in Norway. Education did not account for a third of late 
(y -y) -(3i(w -w) = @2(e -e) + e
where y = total real wage growth (43 years times growth rate) w = log 1870 real wage e = schooling variable (enrolment or literacy) /3i is the coefficient on log 1870 wage in the regression of wage growth on initial wage and enrolment (Panel Ai above) or literacy (Panel A2 above). @2 is the coefficient on the schooling variable in the same regression. Variables with 'bars' refer to sample averages. The list of countries in each regression sample is given in Panel Bi with the country-specific results. The left side of the equation represents residual above or below average growth in wages net of the initial wage. The right side is a calculation of the amount of wage growth due to above or below average levels of the education variable (plus a residual term). By dividing the schooling effect on the right side by the left side, we obtain the percentage of above or below average 'residual' growth in wages attributable to above or below average levels of schooling. The results in Panel B2 are calculated by dividing the growth gap in question into /32 times the difference in the log of education in the two countries being compared. Parentheses around the Iberian entries in Panel B2 indicate that it is Iberian divergence^ not convergence, that is being explained. Note that the results are based on unrounded growth rates, whereas the growth rates in Table 2 have been rounded.
nineteenth century Scandinavian growth. Education didn't even account for a third of Scandinavian catch-up. Education did account for between a tenth and a third of the residual growth after controlling for initial 1870 conditions.
For most of these sixteen countries, literacy and enrolment tell much the same story. For some -like Ireland, Italy and Spain -the differences in Panel Bi are marked, the Italian case being the most extreme. Such differences alert us to problems of data quality; for reasons already stated, we focus on the results using enrolment rates. Not surprisingly, education cannot account for above-average growth in Ireland or Italy; while belowaverage education can account for 16 per cent of below-average Iberian growth (using the suspect literacy data would boost this figure considerably, just as is true in the Scandinavian case).
What about the third question? That is, how much of the gap in real wage growth between each of these seven countries around the European periphery and two leaders -Britain and the USA -was due to schooling? The answers are offered in Panels B2.1 and B2.2 of Table 5 .
Start with the Scandinavian three, where the schooling thesis has had the strongest following, and with the convergence on Britain; and let us, once again, focus on the enrolment results. Here the figures are: about eight per cent for Denmark, six per cent for Norway and five per cent for Sweden or an overall Scandinavian average of six per cent. While these figures may seem to confirm Sandberg's thesis, they are very small (and the figures are smaller still if literacy rates are used). Furthermore, schooling explains even less of the Scandinavian convergence on the United States, indeed none of the convergence when education is measured by enrolment rates. Now consider the Iberian Peninsula relative to Britain. Here the figures are ten per cent for Spain and 58 per cent for Portugal; these imply an overall average of 34 per cent for the Iberians. That is, one third of the Iberian fallback behind Britain was due to very poor schooling. Schooling accounts for even more of the Iberian fall-back behind the USA, over 70 per cent. In contrast, schooling explains none of the Italian real wage catch-up on Britain or the USA. It looks like Tortella is only partly right: schooling mattered in only one part of the Mediterranean Basin. Moreover, schooling explains none of the Irish catch-up on Britain and the USA.
Schooling mattered to catch-up and fall-back around the European periphery, but its impact was limited to Scandinavia and Iberia, and in only one case, Iberia, did it matter much. Globalization forces mattered much more.
The impact of emigration
Did emigration from the European periphery help create enough labour scarcity at home to account for much of the catch-up?
We start with Scandinavia where emigration rates reached their peak in the 1880s, at that time among the highest in Europe. The rate for the decade was 95.2 per thousand of the population in Norway, 70.1 per thousand in Sweden and 39.4 per thousand in Denmark (Hatton and Williamson 1994a, Whereas partial equilibrium models look at single markets in isolation, general equilibrium models explore the simultaneous interaction of all goods and factor markets in an economy. Computable general equilibrium models are fitted to real-world data in a benchmark year, and permit the quantification of those effects identified by theory. A discursive treatment of CGE models can be found at http://www.gams.com/solvers/ mpsge/orourke .htm , Table  A2 .1, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain revised), while the migration impact is based on cols. (3a) and (3b). Since there are no CGE results for the Mediterranean countries and Ireland, the entries for these countries in (4b) and (5b) are based on column (3a), and the British and US results on (3b). Parentheses around the Iberian entries in cols. (4a)-(5b) indicate that it is Iberian divergence that is being explained. Note that cols. (4) and (5) are based on unrounded real wages, while Table 1 ). Given these migration-induced labour force effects, and assuming that the wage-elasticity estimated for Sweden (-0.6796) applies to the rest of Scandinavia as well, then we can estimate the impact of mass migration on Danish and Norwegian convergence too -the rest of Scandinavia 'viewed in the Swedish mirror' if you will (O'Rourke and Williamson 1995b). Columns (4b) and (5b) in Table 6 suggest that mass migration must have contributed less to Danish convergence on Britain (3.1 per cent) and America (47 per cent), but more to Norwegian convergence on Britain (17.3 per cent) and America (65.4 per cent).
What about elsewhere around the European periphery? Since it seems inappropriate to view the rest of the periphery in the Swedish mirror, and since there are no CGE models yet available for the Mediterranean Basin, we elect instead to use the work provided by Taylor and Williamson (1995) who offered alternative estimates of the impact of the mass migrations 1870-1910 on the labour force in all nine countries listed in the first panel of Table 6 (col. 2a) and assessed its impact econometrically on 1910 real wages (col. 3a). As the reader can verify, the two estimates are quite close for the five overlapping countries (col. 2a versus 2b, and col. 3a versus 3b). We shall use the estimates labelled 'a' in everything that follows.
Note first that emigration rates from the poor periphery ranged enormously: they were huge for Ireland and Italy; they were very large for Norway and Sweden; they were modest for Denmark; and they were tiny for Portugal and Spain. The cumulative impact on the labour force at home also varied enormously: it served to lower the Irish 1910 labour force by almost a half (45 per cent) and the Italian 1910 labour force by more than a third (39 per cent); it served to lower the Scandinavian labour force by from 14 to 24 per cent; but it served to lower the Iberian labour force by only five to six per cent. Note further that rich Britain also emigrated, so that her labour force was diminished by 11 per cent, a much bigger impact than was true of Iberia. Finally, immigration appears to have augmented the United States labour force by 24 per cent.
Column (3a) records the impact of these mass-migration-induced labour force changes on real wages, and the second panel of Table 6 reports the bottom line: namely, the share of the observed real wage convergence of the European periphery on Britain and America accounted for by mass migration.
The figures for Ireland and Italy are huge: mass migration accounted for all of the convergence for those two countries. The amazing characteristic of these two countries is that they seem to have relied exclusively on emigration to achieve some convergence on the leaders. 10 We should be sensitive to the possibility that it was unimpressive industrialization at home which helps account for those high Irish and Italian emigration rates, but recall that Table 5 (Panel B2) suggested that schooling could not account for any of the convergence of these two countries on Britain or the USA.
Portugal and Spain, on the other hand, were unable to exploit emigration possibilities. A significant share of their divergence from Britain is explained by 'under-emigration' (about 7-23 per cent for Spain and about 17-59 P e r cent for Portugal). This is not to say that more fundamental problems underlay Iberian performance. Even if the Spanish and Portuguese emigration rates had been large enough to induce the same labour force impact as was true for Norway, these two countries still would have undergone retardation relative to Britain. The 'none' in parentheses under cols. (5a) and (5b) simply means that while mass migration should have helped produce Iberian convergence on the United States, divergence factors overwhelmed these forces. That is, mass migration cannot explain any of the Iberian fall-back on the USA.
Scandinavia lies in between these extremes: on average, a little less than a tenth of the Scandinavian convergence on Britain, and a little more than half of the convergence on the United States, was due to mass migration. The contribution of emigration to convergence was biggest for the poorest country, Norway, and smallest for the richest country, Denmark.
Mass migration explains a very large share of the convergence and its absence around the European periphery. Why did emigration rates vary so much? Why did Iberia fail to exploit this powerful source of catch-up? Hatton and Williamson (1994b) have shown that a culture-specific 'Latin' explanation is not needed to account for those low rates in Iberia, but rather that a common model of European emigration can do the job quite nicely. The model is complex, but the key insight that applies here is the following: since long distance moves are expensive, desperate poverty delays (free) emigration. Labour in the poorest parts of the periphery couldn't finance the move and thus had lower emigration rates (i.e. the Portuguese), while labour in the less poor parts of the periphery could finance the move and thus had higher emigration rates (i.e., the Irish). Furthermore, those who sent out emigrants first in the 1840s and 1850s could use the remittances from those pioneers to finance the moves of others following later. Thus, by the 1880s it was the Irish and the Scandinavians who were best able to exploit emigration as a convergence force, not the Iberians who had the most to gain from mass migration.
Mass migration is one aspect of late nineteenth century globalization that mattered a great deal. The problem, of course, is that the mass migrations must have been intimately related to international capital flows, trade and industrialization.
The impact of international capital flows
From a global perspective, international capital flows were a force for divergence in the late nineteenth century. After all, low wage Europe was a net capital exporter, while the high wage New World was a net capital importer. To explain this apparent paradox, we need not appeal to externalities (Lucas 1990 ), or to other new growth theory exotica; rather, we need only appeal to the existence of a third factor, land, and the role of the overseas frontier, pulling both labour and capital from poor to rich countries, as historians have long recognized.
Nevertheless, there were also substantial capital flows within Europe during the late nineteenth century, with France and Germany taking the lead in lending to the European periphery. Less than 6 per cent of British investments were in Europe at the end of 1913 (Feis 1930, p. 23 Since Sweden absorbed exceptionally heavy doses of foreign capital, we begin the periphery assessment there. Foreign capital was directed into Swedish cities and the railroads, and it was in response to government demand. Most of these capital inflows were used to finance social overhead construction and France was the main market for the Swedish bond issues. A previous paper (O 'Rourke and Williamson 1995a) showed how important British capital exports, and US and Swedish capital imports, were for their respective capital stocks. As Table 7 indicates, capital imports over the four decades following 1870 served to make the 1910 Swedish capital stock 50.1 per cent bigger than it would have been in its absence. Capital exports served to make the 1910 British capital stock 20.4 per cent smaller than it would have been in its absence. The United States was a much more modest capital importer than was Sweden (capital inflows only augmented its 1910 capital stock by 0.3 per cent), so global capital markets should have contributed to Swedish catch-up on America, although much less than in the Anglo-Swedish case.
Once again using CGE models, we estimated that international capital flows accounted for more than a half of the decline in the Anglo-Swedish wage gap, and more than four-tenths of the decline in the US-Swedish wage gap (O'Rourke and Williamson 1995a, Table 1 ). The figures reported in Table 7 are a bit smaller, 43 per cent and 34 per cent respectively.
11 The 11 To repeat, the revision is due to the fact that we are not using three-year averages for 1870 and 1910, as we did in the earlier paper.
results thus appear to support Heckscher's contention that the capital import between i860 and 1910 'was a vital prerequisite for the country's rapid economic upswing' (Heckscher 1954, p. 210) .
What about the rest of Scandinavia? The contribution of foreign capital imports to Danish convergence was likely to have been considerably smaller since they financed a smaller share of domestic accumulation there (Johansen 1985, pp. 230-2; Hansen 1970, pp. 59-64; Jorberg 1970, pp. 478-9) . We have estimated that foreign capital imports served to make the 1910 Danish capital stock 16.3 per cent bigger than it would have been in its absence (O'Rourke and Williamson 1995b) . Norwegian capital imports were also smaller than for Sweden (Riis and Thonstad 1989) . Although Norwegian capital imports were even larger than for Sweden after 1890, Norway was actually a net capital exporter 1870-1890, so the net impact of foreign capital on the 1910 Norwegian capital stock was to raise it by 'only' 17.4 per cent. Thus, the contribution of capital imports to Norwegian wage convergence on Britain or America, while still big, was smaller (about 35 and 20 per cent) than to Swedish wage convergence (about 43 and 34 per cent).
The figures for Danish convergence are similar to those for Norway (about 30 and 16 per cent).
Capital flows thus made a substantial contribution to Scandinavian convergence on the core during the late nineteenth century. What about the Celtic and Mediterranean peripheries? Did international capital flows make a powerful contribution to living standard improvement in these countries too? It is difficult to know, for the simple reason that good balance of payments data are only rarely available for this part of Europe. However, such data as we have tell a surprising story.
We do not know for sure whether Ireland exported or imported capital during the late nineteenth century since trade statistics were not collected after the customs union with Britain in the mid-i82os. The indications, however, are that post-Famine Ireland ran trade surpluses. Indeed, in his evidence to a 1895 Royal Commission, Robert Giffen estimated that Ireland ran a trade surplus of £5.5 m. in 1893.
12 One cannot conclude from this fact alone that Ireland was running current account surpluses, since there was also an 'economic drain' consisting of rents remitted to absentee landlords and excess taxation paid to the British Exchequer.
13 However, Giffen Solar (1979, p. 24) .
concluded that Ireland was probably a net capital exporter and modern Irish historians have speculated that 'Ireland's position on capital account ... moved from net debtor to net creditor status' after i860 (Kennedy 1995, p. 108) . Thus, Ireland probably experienced net capital outflows during the late nineteenth century. Since the US was a net capital importer, capital flows were clearly a force for Irish-American divergence, rather than convergence; since one can only assume that Britain exported even more capital than Ireland, capital flows must have been a (small) force for Anglo-Irish convergence. Capital flows may have implied both Irish catch-up and fallback, depending on which leader is being considered.
A similar picture emerges from official Italian statistics. True, the merchandise trade account was substantially negative throughout the period, but invisible earnings (tourism and shipping) helped offset this to a considerable extent, and in some years were enough to lead to a trade surplus. Net factor income from abroad was negative in the nineteenth century, but positive after 1900, as emigrants' remittances more than offset income earned by foreign capital in Italy (Zamagni 1993, pp. 126-7) . Official balance of payments statistics reveal substantial capital imports in the 1860s and late 1880s, and substantial capital exports from 1894 to 1907.
14 Over the entire period between 1870 and 1913, the official statistics suggest that there were net capital exports from Italy, a force for divergence rather than convergence.
However, the Italian official statistics have been questioned by Giovanni Federico, among others. Certainly the qualitative literature emphasizes capital imports, especially in the 1880s (when state bonds were sold) and the turn of the century (when direct investments became more important). These uncertainties are reflected in Table 7 .
The conventional wisdom for Spain has been that the country ran large deficits on current account ; and Broder's (1976) estimates indicate capital inflows throughout the period. However, Prados de la Escosura (1988, pp. 188-97) has challenged this view. His estimates suggest almost continuous merchandise trade surpluses from 1875 to 1912 (Prados de la Escosura, 1988, pp. 252-4) . More recent unpublished estimates suggest current account deficits between 1870 and 1890, surpluses after the depreciation and tariffs of 1891, deficits around the turn of the century, and surpluses in the decade before the First World War. Net capital inflows must have been very small; even Broder's figures suggest that gross inflows accounted only for around seven per cent of gross domestic fixed capital formation between 1890 and 1913. 15 Current account data are also lacking for Portugal. Lains (1992) has 14 The Italian capital imports figures are given in Fenoaltea (1988, Table 4, pp. 620-21) . 15 Note that Tortella (1994b) has questioned Prados' trade figures. (4) are derived from Williamson (1995 , Table A2 .1, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain revised) and column 2. Three of the Italian entries, and two of the Iberian entries, have question marks, indicating substantial uncertainty even as to the sign of the effect. Capital flows explain none of the Iberian fall-back behind the US if capital inflows raised Iberian capital stocks by more than 0.1 per cent. While the evidence for Ireland is also weak, it is strong enough, we feel, to make unambiguous statements. Parentheses around the Iberian entries in cols. (3) and (4) indicate that it is Iberian divergence that is being explained. Note that cols. (3) and (4) revised the official trade statistics, making the balance of trade deficits much smaller than official estimates had indicated. Moreover, emigrant remittances were also an important component of the Portuguese balance of payments. Figures by Reis (1991) suggest capital inflows between 1865 and 1890. On the other hand, Salazar (1916) claimed that capital fled Portugal after the 1891 financial crisis, that it returned after the 1902 agreement with foreign creditors; and that it fled again in 19075 in response to the dictatorial government ofJoao Franco. 16 The safest assessment would seem to be that capital imports can only have made a relatively small contribution to the Portuguese capital stock in the late nineteenth century.
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There are two main conclusions to be drawn from this brief tour around the European periphery.
18 First, capital flows probably did not greatly reduce wage gaps between the US and the European periphery, except in the case of Scandinavia; but large British capital outflows meant that international capital markets were reducing wage gaps between Britain and the entire periphery. Second, the development of global capital markets did not by itself guarantee that capital would seek out cheap labour. Capital inflows may have made an important contribution to Scandinavian development, but they made no contribution at all to Irish (and possibly Italian) catch-up, and only a tiny contribution to that of Iberia. Precisely why capital did not flow to some poor countries remains an enduring puzzle: possible explanations include insecurity of Irish property; the Iberian abandonment of the Gold Standard; and cultural mysteries.
Trade, tariffs, and economic convergence
What was the impact of trade on the European periphery? The late nineteenth century was a period of dramatic commodity market integration: railways and steamships lowered transport costs, and Europe moved towards free trade in the wake of the i860 Cobden-Chevalier treaty. These developments implied large trade-creating price shocks which affected every European participant, the canonical case being the drop in European grain prices. Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin argued that such commodity market integration should have led to international factor price convergence, as countries everywhere expanded the production and export of commodities which used their abundant (and cheap) factors relatively intensively. For poor labour-abundant and land-scarce countries, this meant rising wages and falling rents. In an earlier paper (O'Rourke and Williamson 1994) we showed that the reduction in trans-Atlantic transport costs had a profound impact on British factor prices, and explained a large fraction of that country's real wage convergence on the US. Can this finding be generalized? Did peripheral countries who actively participated in the development of a global economy undergo more dramatic real wage and labour productivity 16 Cited in Lains (1992, pp. 215-16) . 17 Mata (1995) suggests that capital inflows can only have had a small aggregate impact on the Portuguese economy, but that they were important in particular sectors. His numbers suggest that foreign capital accounted for 12 per cent of net investment between 1851 and 1890, and 42 per cent of net investment between 1891 and 1913. However, he uses official trade statistics; using Lains' revisions would imply much smaller numbers. 18 It goes without saying, of course, that we urgently need balance of payments data for the Celtic and Latin fringes to confront these issues more adequately.
growth than those who tried to insulate themselves from international market forces? There was certainly a great diversity in trade policy around the periphery. Table 8 summarizes such information as we have concerning tariff levels: it includes seven of our peripheral countries together with France and Germany for comparison.
19 These data come in several forms. First, there are Bairoch's (1989) estimates of tariffs on wheat. Second, there are several average tariffs, computed using a variety of weights, for both manufacturing and the economy as a whole. These were computed by the League of Nations in 1927, by Liepmann (1938) , and by Bairoch (1989) himself. Third, we report the estimates of sectoral and overall protection calculated by Estevadeordal (1993) . These represent the only application of Learner's (1988) methodology to pre-1914 data. Table 8 indicates where individual countries ranked among Estevadeordal's eighteen nations in terms of their openness (the most open being ranked 1, and the most protected being ranked 18). We prefer Estevadeordal's figures to the crude tariff averages, but they seem to offer the same inference.
Ireland, of course, was a part of the United Kingdom's customs union, and as such remained a free-trader throughout our period. This is clearly Bairoch (1989) , Table 9 , p. 76. Manufacturing 1913 (3): rank among 18 countries (1 = least protectionist, 18 = most protectionist), based on the adjusted trade intensity ratios in Estevadeordal (1993) , Table  3 -7, P-149-Manufacturing 1913 (4) : rank among 18 countries (1 = least protectionist, 18 = most protectionist), based on the openness measures in Estevadeordal (1993) , Table 3 .7, p. 150. Wheat 1913: levels of duties on wheat, calculated by Bairoch (1989) , Table 9 , p. 76. Agriculture 1913 (1): rank among 18 countries (1 = least protectionist, 18 = most protectionist), based on the adjusted trade intensity ratios in Estevadeordal (1993) , Table  3 .7, p. 149. Agriculture 1913 (2): rank among 18 countries (1 = least protectionist, 18 = most protectionist), based on the openness measures in Estevadeordal (1993 ), Table 3.7, p. 150. Overall 1913 : import duties as % of special total imports (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) , calculated by Bairoch (1989 ), Table 9, p. 76. Overall 1913 : League of Nations estimate, as reported in Bairoch (1989 ), Table 9, p. 76. Overall 1913 (3): Liepmann (1938 estimate, as reported in Bairoch (1989 ), Table 9, p. 76. Overall 1913 : rank among 18 countries (1 = least protectionist, 18 = most protectionist), based on the adjusted trade intensity ratios in Estevadeordal (1993) , Table  3 . 8, p. 151. Overall 1913 (5) : rank among 18 countries (1 = least protectionist, 18 = most protectionist), based on the openness measures in Estevadeordal (1993) , Table 3 .8, p. 151. reflected in Table 8 , which shows Ireland to be the most open country overall in our sample according to nearly all the measures available. Denmark, as is well known, adhered to free trade in agriculture throughout the grain invasion, engaging in a radical structural adjustment in the process. Table 8 also indicates that Denmark protected manufacturing to a greater extent than is often appreciated. Overall, however, the conventional wisdom appears to be borne out: Denmark was one of the most open countries around the European periphery, second only to Ireland. Sweden, on the other hand, conforms well with the Continental model of liberalisation followed by reversion to protection. Faced with the invasion of New World grain, agricultural protection was adopted in 1888; Sweden imposed moderately high tariffs on both agriculture and industry, although she appears to have been rather more open than Italy and the Iberians. It seems likely that Norway was less open than Sweden on the eve of the First World War, but focusing on the end of the period masks most of the story: it was only in 1895 that protectionist sentiment in Norway increased, and grain was only protected in 1905. Over most of our period, Norway was less protectionist than Sweden.
Italy is another country which conforms well with the Continental model. A free trader in the wake of Unification, Italy introduced moderate tariffs in 1878, and rather more severe tariffs in 1887. The latter duties led to a trade war with France, which lasted until 1892. By 1913 Italy was one of the most highly protected economies in Europe, at least according to Estevadeordal. Liberalization was both shorter and less dramatic in Spain. Prohibitions were abolished in 1869 and replaced with tariffs of 30-35 per cent; 1892 saw a return to very severe protection for cotton textiles, iron and steel, and cereals. Finally, while Bairoch (1989) portrays Portuguese trade policy as being fairly liberal until the adoption of a strict protectionist tariff in 1892, Lains points to the average tariff evidence, which indicates that Portuguese manufacturing enjoyed tariff protection of more than 20 per cent between 1843 and 1913. 20 It is certainly clear from Table 8 that both Spain and Portugal were highly protected in 1913: in our sample, Iberia appears to be the region least open to trade on the eve of the First World War.
Can Scandinavian catch-up and Iberian fall-back be explained by relatively more liberal Nordic trade policies? Only history can supply the answer, given that theory is ambiguous about the issue (see O'Rourke, 1996a, for an extended discussion). A recent paper by Sachs and Warner (1995) The political economy literature on late nineteenth century European trade is vast, but it focuses on the core industrial countries while tending to ignore the periphery; it focuses on the causes of trade policies, rather than on their consequences; and it focuses on individual country studies rather than on comparative assessments. 21 Obvious and notable exceptions include 'Portugal was never a free trade country' (Lains 1992, p. 50) . A key statement in the political economy literature remains Kindleberger (1951) ; more recent contributions, by political scientists, include Rogowski (1989) and Verdier (1994) . Bairoch's (1976b) monumental book, and Berend and Ranki's (1980,1982) work on the European periphery. 22 Bairoch is a pessimist regarding the impact of free trade in nineteenth century Europe. His figures show aggregate growth on the Continent slowing during the free trade era while accelerating during the succeeding protectionist phase up to the First World War.
23 Moreover, Bairoch (1972, pp. 224-26; 1976b, pp. 287-95 ) thought the free trade era was associated with international divergence, while the protectionist phase was associated with convergence. The more recent evidence in Section 2 suggests the contrary, but in any case, Bairoch is invoking post hoc ergopropter hoc logic. Observing correlations between trade policy and GDP per worker-hour and real wage trends is not enough; we need to isolate the size of the price shocks associated with trade policy during this period, and we need economic models which can assess the impact of those price shocks on living standards.
While neoclassical theory predicts that free trade improves aggregate welfare, it is ambiguous about real wages. Consider a world in which agriculture produces food using land and labour, and industry produces manufactures using capital and labour. Let food be the import good and manufactures the export good. When food prices decline due to a grain invasion, agricultural labour demand falls, and nominal wages decline; on the other hand, lower food prices imply a lower cost of living for workers. The net impact on real wages is therefore ambiguous. If food is a sufficiently important part of workers' budgets, and if agriculture is a sufficiently small employer, then real wages increase; otherwise, they decline.
In countries such as Britain, where only a small share of the labour force was in agriculture, one might surmise that the cost-of-living effect would have dominated the labour demand effect, and that cheap grain would have boosted real wages; whereas in peripheral countries, with much larger agricultural sectors, the labour demand effect might have dominated, with cheap grain lowering real wages. In that case, free trade in grain could have led to real wage and living standard divergence within Europe, rather than convergence, and O'Rourke (1996b) finds some evidence for this.
However, grain was not the only commodity which was traded in the late nineteenth century, and cheap grain was not the only price shock to which free-trading Europeans had to respond. To estimate the total impact of globalization on the European periphery, we need to measure changing international price gaps for animal products, 'Mediterranean' agricultural products, primary commodities (such as iron ore and timber), manufactured goods, and grain itself. We did precisely this for Britain, the United States and Sweden in previous papers Williamson 1994, 1995a) . There was certainly trans-Atlantic commodity price convergence between 1870 and 1913, affecting grain, beef, pork, bacon, mutton, butter, bar iron, cotton textiles, coal, copper, hides, wool, tin, cotton and many other tradables. What of Anglo-Swedish price gaps? While we found price convergence for vegetable products, animal products, and forestry products, the price gap between Britain and Sweden in Swedish home-market-oriented industries fell only modestly, perhaps reflecting the effects of rising tariffs, while there was no evidence of price convergence affecting Swedish export industries.
What impact did this Swedish commodity market integration into the global economy have on catch-up? As Table 9 indicates, when a Swedish CGE model is used to estimate the effects of Anglo-Swedish price convergence, the results were hardly dramatic. Anglo-Swedish commodity price convergence served to raise Swedish wages by only 1.9 per cent, accounting for only about 3 per cent of the decline in the Anglo-Swedish wage gap.
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US-Swedish commodity price convergence had a little bigger impact, although still small. Commodity price convergence between the US and Sweden increased Swedish real wages by 6.2 per cent, and raised US real wages by 0.3 per cent (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1995c, revised Table 3 , p. 922), accounting for a little less than one-tenth of the Swedish catch-up on the US.
However, the really important point about these results is that while cheap grain on its own might have lowered Swedish real wages (O'Rourke 1996b), commodity price convergence in general increased Swedish real wages. We suspect that what was true of Sweden was true of the rest of Scandinavia as well. From what we know about the trade policies of our three countries, Heckscher-Ohlin effects were probably larger in Norway than in Sweden, and a lot larger in Denmark. This is reflected in the entries for the two countries in Table 9 . What about the rest of the European periphery? Boyer et at (1994) constructed a model of the Irish economy for 1907-8. While the model was originally constructed in order to assess the impact of emigration on Irish living standards, it can also be used to calculate the impact of declining trans-Atlantic price gaps on the Irish economy. We ask: what would Irish real wages have been in 1908 if trans-Atlantic price gaps had remained constant in the four decades after 1870, rather than declining as they actually did? When these counterfactual price shocks are imposed on the Irish model, real Irish wages increase by 9.6 per cent, implying that declining trans-Atlantic price gaps lowered Irish real wages by 8.8 per cent. 26 Real wages in the United States would only have been a fraction lower in the absence of trans-Atlantic price convergence. Table 9 thus indicates that Heckscher-Ohlin forces actually increased the US-Irish wage gap; they did not contribute to US-Irish convergence at all.
We have not estimated the evolution of Anglo-Irish price gaps in the late nineteenth century, but suspect that commodity market integration across the Irish Sea led above all to an increase in Irish animal product prices, as rail and steamships helped Irish farmers meet the growing British urban demand for breakfast foods. To the extent that Irish animal husbandry was land-intensive, this may have further reduced the demand for labour in Ireland. To evaluate the hypothesis more carefully, we would need an Irish model which distinguished between tillage and pasture (the current version has only one agricultural sector); and we would need price information which is currently unavailable. Table 9 reflects our uncertainty.
The Mediterranean countries generate even more uncertainty. As before, we would like to distinguish between trans-Atlantic and intra-European commodity market integration. If the Irish experience is any guide, then the trans-Atlantic effect, by lowering grain prices, may have been to lower Mediterranean wages. On the other hand, intra-European integration may have had the opposite effect, by increasing the output of labour-intensive Mediterranean products (such as olives and wine), and of labour-intensive industrial and mining activities in Italy and Spain. Table 9 thus suggests that while trans-Atlantic integration may have contributed to the Iberian divergence observed, intra-European integration probably contributed nothing to the observed divergence since it should have led to convergence. We admit that this is purely speculative.
Measuring commodity market integration in various parts of the European periphery, and calculating the impact of this integration on individual countries, should be a major research priority. But what we know so far suggests that these forces did not play a consistent role in contributing to catch-up and falling behind around the periphery. While it made a significant contribution to Scandinavian real wage catch-up, the contribution was far more modest, and often negative, elsewhere.
The challenge of comparative history
Table 10 summarizes our initial efforts to isolate the sources of late nineteenth century real wage and living standard catch-up and fall-back around the European periphery. The comparative history suggests an explicit agenda.
First, it suggests that it might be of some value to think a little less like an economist and a little more like an historian. That is, it would be a mistake to try to force that experience into one tidy explanation, whether it comes from the fertile mind of Heckscher, Ohlin, Sandberg, or Tortella. Consider: Bad schooling explains an enormous share of the Iberian fall-back, but it explains none of the Irish and Italian catch-up. Good schooling certainly helps explain some of the Scandinavian success, but is five or ten per cent worth all the shouting? Oddly enough, the Scandinavian schooling thesis seems to work best in Iberia.
The workings of international factor markets on capital deepening was profound everywhere around the periphery. Mass migrations and international capital flows together served to explain a third to a half of the spectacular Scandinavian catch-up on Britain. They served to explain all of the Irish and Italian catch-up. And their relatively small numbers served to explain an important part of Iberian failure. Iberian isolation did contribute to its late nineteenth century failure, but it was factor market isolation that mattered most. Oddly enough, comparative debates over performance around the periphery have said little about factor market integration. In particular, it has said little about the inability of some poor countries to exploit emigration while others exploited it so well. These questions warrant more attention.
The libraries are full of debates over late nineteenth century tariff policy and the questions: What were the implications of the policy choice between free trade and autarky? What were the implications of world commodity market integration induced by declining transport costs? Given the amount of ink spilt on the question, we were surprised by the tentative answer emerging from Table 10 . The figures, where we can calculate them, are uniformly small! They are even small (or negative) in the presence of free trade, as in Denmark and Ireland. They are unlikely to have explained much more than five per cent of Scandinavian catch-up on Britain, and while autarky may help explain Iberian failure, we suspect that it doesn't explain much. These are striking inferences that warrant more attention.
Second, note that the residual is missing in some parts of the periphery. The last column in Table 10 reports the residual after the first four columns are added up. The entries for Scandinavia seem plausible: about half of the catch-up on Britain can be explained by globalization and schooling; technological mysteries must explain the other half. Reasonably enough, the residual is much smaller in the case of Scandinavian catch-up on the dynamic US economy. The entries, however, are zero for Ireland and Italy, and almost zero for Portugal. A zero implies that none of the Irish or Italian catch-up on Britain was due to higher rates of Irish or Italian total factor productivity growth. It also implies that almost none of the Portuguese fallback can be attributed to slower rates of Portuguese total factor productivity growth relative to Britain. If true, these are striking inferences that warrant more attention.
Third, our tour around the periphery excluded eastern Europe, southeastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean Basin, and the southern Mediterranean Basin. Is there reason to believe that the sources of convergence or divergence were different there?
